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CRIMINAL LAW COMMENTS
pressed prior to indictment.35 An extension of the confession doctrine,
however, would be easier and far less confusing.
That on c~rtain occasions federal and local police officials have used
gestapo methods in wringing confessions out of criminal suspects is a
matter of common knowledge.36 No lengthy discussion is necessary to
point out the glaring incompatibility of such methods with the protec-
tion of individuals which the Federal Constitution endeavors to guar-
antee. Perhaps a general adoption of the circuit court's ruling will
obstruct public prosecutors more than negligibly. Even so, it seems
consistent with the aims of fundamental constitution precepts.
ALLAN F. CONWiLL
Admisibility in Evidence of Statements Made in the
Presence of the Defendant
There exists today a popular misconception that merely because a
statement has been "made in the presence of the defendant" it is for
that reason alone admissible in evidence.' No justification for this view
is to be found in any of the exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, 2 or in any
general principle of Evidence. The origin and development of the mis-
conception, however, can be accounted for by a number of decisions which
used the phrase "made in the defendant's presence" as a rule of thumb
in place of a correct determination of whether or not the statements were
hearsaya
That the defendant's presence is not the conclusive element was recog-
nized in the recent case of People v. Bob,4 where the Supreme Court of
California found it reversible error for the trial court to admit certain
extra-judicial statements of an incriminatory and accusatory character,
even though they were made in the defendant's presence. In reversing
the trial court the state supreme court held that unless such accusatory or
incriminatory statements are introduced to show an admission of guilt
35 Go-Bart Co. v. U. S., 282 U. S. 344 (1931).
36 "Report of National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement," VoL
IV, "Report on Lawlessness in Law' Enforcement," (1931). Kooken, "Post War
Influence Upon Criminal Investigation," (1946), 35 J. Crim. Law & Criminology 426.
.1 Di Carlo v. Uniited States, 6 P. (2d) 364, 366 (C.C.A. 2d, 1925): " It is common
error to suppose that everytihing said in the presence of a defendant is ipso facto
admissible against him."
2These exceptions are the following: dying Declarations, statements of fact
against interest, statements about family history, attesting witnesses' statements,
regular Entries in the course of business, statements about private land boundaries,
statements of decedents in general, reputation about land, character, marriage, etc.,
scientific treatises, commercial and professional lists, etc., affidavits, statements of
physical sensations and mental conditions, spontaneous exclamations,' and official
statements. Wigmore, Treatise on Evidence (3rd Ed. 1940) §§1420-1426.
3 The Hearsay Rule operates to exclude testimony that does not derive its validity
solely from the witness, but which rests partly on a declarant not before the court.
Because the declarant is not before the court for a cross examination to test the
truthfulness of the assertion, such evidence is considered untrustworthy and therefore
inadmissible. Two examples will illustrate the point: (1) where A testifies as to B's
utterances for the purpose of showing what was said by B, and (2) where A testifies
to something said by B for the purpose of proving the truthfulness of B's utter-
ances. It is clear that the first example is not hearsay since the truth of B's state-
ment is not in question and it is immaterial that B is unavailable for cross exami-
nation. The second example is hearsay because it appears that a cross examination
of A can not adequately probe into the truthfulness of the statements of B inasmuch
as the declarant is absent. Wigmore, supra note 2, §§1361-1362.




on the part of the defendant by his silence, they are clearly subject to the
operation of the Hearsay Rule and therefore inadmissible. 5
It has long been the rule that when a defendant in a civil or criminal
suit makes an extra-judicial admission of guilt, testimony of such admis-
sion may be reqeived in evidence. 6 For example, A may testify that in
response to B's accusation, the defendant readily admitted his guilt.
From that universally accepted doctrine there was developed the maxim
"silence gives consent."'7 This maxim was a reasonable extension of the
doctrine of admissions under the theory that a man may admit his guilt
just as effectively by silence in the face of an incriminatory or accusatory
statement as by an outright admission of guilt. Like all maxims, this one
furnished a broad principle that could not serve without definite qualifi-
cations based upon some very practical considerations.8
The following qualifications to the principle of "admissions by silence"
have been developed and applied by the courts: (1) there must have been
an extra-judicial statement, either incriminatory or accusatory, (2) made
within the presence of the defendant, (3) within his hearing, (4) under-
stood by the defendant, (5) under circumstances which afforded him an
opportunity to reply, (6) and to which statement an innocent man if
similarly situated would reply with a denial. 9 At the same time the doc-
trine of admissions was extended by the courts in deciding that extra-judicial statements need not be of such character that a failure to deny
them impliedly admits guilt of every element of the crime for which a
party is being tried.' 0 It is enough if the silence furnishes a factor for
5 Although the decision was by a divided court, the two dissenting opinions dis-
agreed with the majority only as to the factor of defendant's alleged failure to
properly object to the introduction of hearsay testimony in evidence. Cf. People v.
Louis, 275 N.Y.S. 263 (1934) (where defendant failed to object to hearsay testimony
at all).
6 Van Meter v. Gurney, 240 fll. App. 165 (1926).
7 Wigmore, supra note 2, §1071.
8 Wigmore has suggested that the qualifications universally applied (discussed
infra) by the courts should be modified. His theory is that they were designed to
protect the defendant when he was unable to take the witness stand in his own
behalf; however with that disability everywhere removed he suggests a less rigid
enforcement of the qualifications. Wigmore, supra note 2, §1071. For the historical
development of the qualifications see Jasmin v. Parker et. al., 102 Vt. 405, 14"8 Atl.
874 (1929); Mattocks v. Lyman, 16 Vt. 113 (1844); Vail v. Strong, 10 Vt. 457(1838); Moore v. Smith, 14 S. & R. 388; Cohen, The Spirit of Our Laws (2d Ed.)
at page 190.
9 Gentilli v. U. S., 22 F. (2d) 67 (C.C.A. 9th, 1927); People v. Willmurth, 176
P. (2d) 102 (1947); Tillman v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 47, 37 S.E. (2d) 768(1946); Kincheloe v. State, 147 Tex. Crim. 596, 183 S.W. (2d) 463 (1944); Com-
monwealth v. Zinunerman, 143 Pa. 331, 17 Atl. (2d) 714 (1941); Clark v. State,
240 Ala. 65, 197 So. 23 (1940) (murder; inculpatory statements of co-conspirator
unanswered; admitted); People v. Nerida, 29 Cal. App. (2d) 11, 83 P. (2d) 964(1938) (accusatory statements made by witness in presence of defendant unan-
swered) ; People v. Cozzi, 364 Ill. 20, 2 N.E. (2d) 915 (1935); State v. Wilson, 205
N.C. 376, 171 S.E. 338 (1933) ; People v. Kessler, 333 lI. 451, 164 N.E. 840 (1929) ;
People v. Dean, 308 Ill. 74, 139 N.E. 37 (1923); Bell v. McDonald, 308 Ill. 329, 139
N.E. 613 (1923); Tate v. State, 95 Miss. 138, 48 So. 13 (1909); People v. Andrae,
305 Dl. 530, 137 N.E. 496 (1922); State v. Epstein, 25 R.I. 131, 55 At]. 204 (1903)(accusation made while defendant in semi-conscious state inadmissible); People
v. Koerner, 154 N.Y. 355, 48 N.E. 370 (1897) (statement made while defendant in
pain held inadmissible); People v. Ackerson, 124 Ill. 563, 16 N.E. 847 (1888); 1
Greenleaf, Evidence, §§197-215; Roscoe, Evidence, §353; Wharton, Criminal Evi-
dence. §656; Wigraore, supra note 2, §1071.




the jury to use in determining guilt. The silence is at most an implied
admission or acquiescence in the truth of accusatory or incriminatory
statements with the testimonial weight to be given the silence dependent
upon the character of the statement."
It must be remembered that the extra-judicial statement alone would
of itself be objectionable as hearsay testimony, being a statement made at
a time other than at the trial, offered to-prove-the truth of the matter
therein asserted, and based entirely on the credibility of a declarant not
then before the court. However, in cases of implied admissions, as in
cases of express admissions, the extra-judicial statements or accusations
are not offered as evidence of their truth merely because they were
uttered. They are secondary in nature and are accepted in evidence as
untainted by the hearsay stigma because they are a necessary predicate
to the showing of the substantive evidence, i.e., the reaction of the defend-
ant thereto.' 2 It can not be over-emphasized that receipt into evidence
of extra-judicial statements for the purpose of showing defendant's fail-
ure to deny them must be accomplished with caution. Silence in the face
of statements made out of court is too great a prejudicial factor to be
admitted into evidence lightly. Therefore the courts should and do scru-
tinize with zeal the circumstances to determine whether the previously
stated qualifications have been met. To allow but one of these qualifica-
tions, i.e., the defendant's presence, to be all controlling, would be to place
a lesser burden of proof upon the prosecution when it seeks to introduce
an admission by silence than when it introduces an express admission
from the accused person. When an express admission is introduced it is
self-evident that the defendant heard the accusation, understood the
accusation, and felt obliged to make an admission, for otherwise no
answer would be forthcoming from him. It appears reasonable, therefore,
that the prosecution when introducing an implied admission should have
the same burden of showing the existence of these various qualifying
conditions.
There is a wide divergence of judicial opinion concerning the accepta-
bility of statements made while defendant is under arrest or in custody. 13
Some courts hold that the mere fact of arrest or detention does not
destroy admissibility but should be weighed as a factor in considering
whether the accused was able and called upon to make a reply.14 In other
jurisdictions it has been held that the defendant is under no obligation to
speak when under arrest or in custody, and that the maintenance of
silence in the face of accusations is the best policy strategically for the
11 State v. Brown, 209 Minn. 478, 296 N.W. 582 (1941); Doherty v. Edwards,
227 Ia. 1264, 290 N.E. 672 (1940); but of Greenwood v. Bailey, 28 Ala. App. 362,
184 So. 285 (1928).
12 See Wharton, supra note 9 §656.
13 Wharton, supra note 9, §661; Wigmore supra note 2 §1072.
14 Hawthorn v. State, 206 Ark. 1009, 178 S.W. (2d) 490; Cawthorn v. State, 71
Ga. App. 497, 31 S.W. (2d) 64 (1944) (assault with intent to murder; silence of
defendant when statement of co-defendant read in his presence held admissible);
'Emmett v. State, 195 Ga. 517, 25 S.E. (2d) 9 (1943); Commonwealth v. Vallone,
347 Pa. 419, 32 Atl. (2d) 889 (1943) (transporting female for purpose of prosti-
tution; statement read to defendant held admissible; see dissent by Maxey, J.);
Muse v. State, 29 Ala. App. 271, 196 So. 148 (1940); Hardwick v. State, 26 Ala.
App. 536, 164 So. 107 (1935) (a co-defendant makes accusation in presence of other
defendant); People v. Egan, 133 Cal. App. 152, 23 P. (2d) 1042 (1933); People
v. Kessler, 333 Ill. 451, 164 N.E. 840 (1929).
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accused to follow.15 Wharton in his treatise on criminal evidence has
supported this latter view on the grounds that it has long been a popular
practice among police officers to read detailed statements purportedly of
a co-defendant with a view of eliciting either a complete confession or an
admission by silence, to be used against the defendant to whom the state-
ment is read.16 He believes that such accusatory statements should be
held inadmissible on the ground that there is no necessity for denying or
answering them. 17 A doctrine knQwn as the Massachusetts Rule has
developed, which strictly holds that the mere fact of arrest is sufficient
to render inadmissible an implied admission, but the arrest must be actual
and based on charges of commission of a crime, and custody must be such
as to deprive the accused of his freedom.18
It appears that the general approach to determine admissibility of
extra-judicial statements has consisted chiefly of an in-estigation to deter-
mine the factor of defendant's presence. That such approach has been
highly unsatisfactory is evidenced by the ambiguous and uncertain lan-
guage used by the courts, and the resulting uncertainty and confusion.
Because the objection to the introduction of such statements is based upon
their hearsay character, it is submitted that only a determination of the
hearsay elements in each instance will result in consistent and under-
standable holdings. The unrealistic and unwarranted use of a theory
that the "defendant's presence" as the criterion can lead only to a
confusion of concepts and a gross misapplication of evidentiary rules.
IRwIN J. SHAPIRO
15 U. S. v. LoBiondo, 135 F. (2d) 130 (C.C.A. 2d, 1943); Yep v. U. S., 83 F. (2d)
41 (C.C.A. 10th, 1936); State v. Redwine, 23 Wash. (2d) 467, 161 P. (2d) 205
(1945); State v. Bowdry, 346 Mo. 1090, 145 S.W. (2d) 127 (1940); Trimble v.
State, (Texas Crim. Rpts. 1937) 104 S.W. (2d) 31' (incriminating statement made
over telephone in defendant's presence); State v. McKenzie, 184 Wash. 32, 49 P.
(2d) 1115 (1935).
16 Wharton, supra note 9 §661
17 See People v. Simmons, 28 Cal. (2d) 699, 172 P. (2d) 18 (1946) (for an indi-
cation of a trend towards curtailing admissibility of statements made while de-
fendant under arrest; noteworthy because of California's former policy of acceptance
of all such admissions by silence).
Is See Commonwealth v. Morriss, 264 Mass. 314, 162 N.E. 362 (1928) (admission
prior to arrest); Commonwealth v. Reibstein, 257 Mass. 436, 154 N.E. 271 (1926)
(admission by silence prior to arrest followed by reiteration after arrest of former
admission).
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